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In this paper, we call for renewed attention to the structure and structuring of work within and between organizations. We argue that a multi-level approach, with jobs as a core analytic construct, is a way to draw connections among economic sociology, organizational sociology, the sociology of work and occupations, labor studies and stratification and address the important problems of both increasing inequality and declining economic productivity.

This double volume presents a collection of 23 papers on how institutions matter to socio-economic life. The papers delve deeply into the practical impact an institutional approach enables, as well as how such research has the potential to influence policies relevant to critical institutional changes unfolding in the world today. In Volume 48A, the focus is on the micro foundations of institutional impacts. In Volume 48B, the focus is on the macro consequences of institutional arrangements. Our introduction provides an overview to the two volumes, identifies points of contact between the papers, and briefly summarizes each contribution. We close by noting avenues for future research on how institutions matter. Overall, the volumes provide a cross-section of cutting edge institutional thought and empirical research, highlighting a variety of fruitful directions for knowledge accumulation and development.

Theory suggests that the market for corporate control, which constitutes an important external governance mechanism, may substitute for internal governance. Consistent with this notion, using a novel measure of takeover vulnerability primarily based on state legislation, this paper aims to investigate the effect of the takeover market on board characteristics with special emphasis on board gender diversity.

This paper exploits a novel measure of takeover vulnerability based on state legislation. This novel measure is likely exogenous as the legislation was imposed from outside the firm. By using an exogenous measure, the analysis is less vulnerable to endogeneity and is thus more likely to show a causal effect.

The results show that a more active takeover market leads to lower board gender diversity. Specifically, a rise in takeover vulnerability by one standard deviation results in a decline in board gender diversity by 10.01%. Moreover, stronger takeover market susceptibility also brings about larger board size and less board independence, corroborating the substitution effect. Additional analysis confirms the results, including propensity score matching, generalized method of moments dynamic panel data analysis and instrumental variable analysis.

The study is the first to explore the effect of the takeover market on board gender diversity. Unlike most of the previous research in this area, which suffers from endogeneity, this paper uses a novel measure of takeover vulnerability that is probably exogenous. The results are thus much more likely to demonstrate causality.

Exploiting a novel measure of hostile takeover exposure primarily based on the staggered adoption of state legislations, we explore a crucial, albeit largely overlooked, aspect of corporate social responsibility (CSR). In particular, we investigate CSR inequality, which is the inequality across different CSR categories. Higher inequality suggests a less balanced, more lopsided, CSR policy.

In addition to the standard regression analysis, we perform several robustness checks including propensity score matching, entropy balancing and an instrumental-variable analysis.

Our results show that more takeover exposure exacerbates CSR inequality. Specifically, a rise in takeover vulnerability by one standard deviation results in an increase in CSR inequality by 4.53–5.40%. The findings support the managerial myopia hypothesis, where myopic managers promote some CSR activities that are useful to them in the short run more than others, leading to higher CSR inequality.

Our study is the first to exploit a unique measure of takeover vulnerability to investigate the impact of takeover threats on CSR inequality, which is an important aspect of CSR that is largely overlooked in the literature. We aptly fill this void in the literature.

Capitalizing on a unique measure of takeover susceptibility principally based on the staggered implementation of state laws, this study aims to explore the takeover market’s effect on managerial ownership. The market for corporate control, often known as the takeover market, is an important external governance mechanism, whereas managerial ownership is a vital internal governance instrument. Managerial ownership brings into convergence the interests of shareholders and managers. The originality of this study arises from the usage of state-level anti-takeover legislations as a measure which is beyond the control of firms and plausibly exogenous to firm-specific characteristics.

In addition to the standard regression analysis, this study also executes a variety of robustness checks to minimize endogeneity, i.e. propensity score matching, entropy balancing, instrumental–variable analysis, Lewbel’s (2012) heteroscedastic identification and Oster’s (2019) testing for coefficient stability.

Based on a large sample of US firms, the results show that more hostile takeover threats bring about significantly lower managerial ownership. The results reinforce the prediction of the substitution hypothesis. The disciplinary function of the takeover market reduces agency conflict to the point where managerial ownership is less necessary as a governance mechanism. Specifically, a rise in takeover susceptibility by one standard deviation diminishes managerial ownership by 7.22%.

`To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to shed light on the impact of the takeover market on managerial ownership using a novel measure mainly based on the staggered adoption of state laws, which are plausibly exogenous to individual firms’ characteristics. Consequently, unlike prior research, this study is more likely to indicate a causal effect, rather than merely a correlation.

Exploiting an innovative measure of corporate culture based on machine learning and earnings conference calls, this study aims to investigate how corporate culture is influenced by hostile takeover threats. To sidestep endogeneity, this study uses a unique measure of takeover vulnerability principally based on the staggered implementation of state legislations, which are plausibly exogenous.

In addition to the standard regression analysis, this study also executes a variety of other empirical tests such as propensity score matching, entropy balancing and an instrumental variable analysis, to demonstrate that the results are robust. The final sample includes 27,663 firm-year observations from 4,092 distinct companies from 2001 to 2014.

This study documents that more takeover exposure weakens corporate culture considerably, consistent with the managerial myopia hypothesis. Threatened by the takeover risk, managers tend to behave myopically and are less likely to make long-term investments that promote strong corporate culture in the long run. Additional analysis focusing on a culture of innovation, which is especially vulnerable to managerial myopia, produces similar evidence.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to explore the effect of takeover susceptibility on corporate culture using a distinctive metric of corporate culture based on textual analysis.

Exploiting two novel measures of takeover vulnerability and asset redeployability, this paper aims to investigate the effect of the takeover market on redeployable assets. Redeployable assets are those with alternative uses. Asset redeployability is a crucial concept in the literature on investment irreversibility.

In addition to the standard regression analysis, the authors execute several robustness checks: propensity score matching, entropy balancing, instrumental-variable analysis and generalized method of moment dynamic panel data analysis.

The authors’ results reveal that more takeover threats reduce asset redeployability significantly, corroborating the managerial myopia hypothesis. Hostile takeover threats reduce managers’ job security and thus induce them to myopically focus on the current utilization of assets in the short run, rather than how they may be deployed in the long run, resulting in less asset redeployability.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to investigate the effect of takeover threats on asset redeployability. Because the authors’ measure of takeover vulnerability is principally based on the staggered passage of state legislations, which are plausibly exogenous, the authors’ results likely reflect causality, rather than merely an association.

Exploiting a unique measure of hostile takeover exposure principally based on the staggered adoption of state legislations, the authors investigate how external audit quality is influenced by the discipline of the takeover market. External auditors and the takeover market both function as important instruments of external corporate governance.

The authors execute a standard regression analysis and run a variety of robustness checks to minimize endogeneity, namely, propensity score matching (PSM), entropy balancing, an instrumental-variable analysis, Generalized method of moment (GMM) dynamic panel data analysis and Lewbel's (2012) heteroscedastic identification.

The authors’ immense sample spans half a century, encompassing nearly 180,000 observations and 17 takeover-related state legislations, one of the largest samples in the literature in this area. The authors’ results suggest that firms with more takeover exposure are significantly less likely to use Big N auditors. Therefore, a more active takeover market results in poorer external audit quality, corroborating the substitution hypothesis. The discipline of the takeover market substitutes for the necessity for a high-quality external auditor. Specifically, a rise in takeover susceptibility by one standard deviation lowers the probability of using a Big N auditor by 4.29%.

The authors’ study is the first to examine the effect of the takeover over market on audit quality using a novel measure of hostile takeover susceptibility mainly based on the staggered implementation of state legislation. Because the enactment of state legislation is beyond the control of any firm individually, it is plausibly exogenous. The authors’ results therefore probably reflect a causal influence rather than merely a correlation.

The vigilante subgenre represents one of the more problematic trends in American action cinema, as it inherently boasts reactionary sentiments through the promotion of violence as an adequate means of asserting one's masculinity. As will be argued in this chapter, American vigilante films can be categorised into three distinct historical waves: the 1970s, the 2000s and the 2010s. The products of each wave present themes of masculinity relevant to their respective cultural period, specifically, anti-counterculture sentiments, post-9/11 anxieties and a growing cultural awareness of toxic masculinity. The third wave of vigilante films is particularly noteworthy in that it correlates with the prospective emergence of metamodernism, a cultural movement that, in contrast to postmodernism's use of apathy as response to trauma, opts for a cautiously optimistic return to metanarratives. Consequently, third wave vigilante films provide more deconstructive portrayals of vigilante figures through metamodernism's oscillation between irony and optimism. This chapter will outline the history of these three waves of vigilante cinema and provide textual analysis of Blue Ruin (2013) and You Were Never Really Here (2017), two third wave films that demonstrate self-reflexive portrayals of vigilante violence in correlation with metamodern masculinity. The results of these analyses indicate that vigilante films, and perhaps American action cinema in its entirety, are moving towards narratives that seek to challenge the more reactionary sentiments of films from years prior.

The purpose of this study is to shed light on the impact of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on asset redeployability. Capitalizing on a novel measure of asset redeployability, the authors explore the effect of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on redeployable assets using a unique text-based measure of EPU. Asset redeployability is an important aspect of sustainability that has been largely overlooked. More redeployable assets can be repurposed for a variety of uses, lessening the necessity for new products and thus conserving natural resources.

In addition to the standard regression analysis, the authors execute a variety of robustness checks, i.e. propensity score matching, entropy balancing, instrumental-variable analysis, GMM dynamic panel data analysis and use Oster’s (2019) approach for testing coefficient stability. Importantly, the authors incorporate firm fixed effects in the analysis, which helps mitigate endogeneity due to unobservable firm characteristics.

Based on an immense sample of over 200,000 observations over three decades, the results reveal that greater uncertainty raises asset redeployability significantly. The findings corroborate the managerial prudence hypothesis. The future deployment of assets is less predictable in times of increased uncertainty. Consequently, during uncertain times, it is more prudent to have assets that can be redeployed for multiple purposes.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to explore the impact of EPU on asset redeployability, which is a critical aspect of sustainability that has rarely been investigated in the literature. The authors fill this important void in the literature. The authors extend the literature in EPU, asset redeployability as well as sustainability.